• Media effect on polarization hypothesized as either benign or malign.
Introduction
and Alesina and Tabellini (1990) theorize that ideological polarization drives government debt. Azzimonti (2011) theorizes that it implies greater tax distortions and lower investment. Empirical work has found it to cause larger political budget cycles (Alt and Lassen, 2006) and smaller government (Lindqvist and Östling, 2010) . 1 If polarization underpins policy failure, then researchers should strive to understand its causes. This note investigates the role of the media.
Hypotheses
The electorate derives information concerning political performance through the media. The 'benign' view of the media is articulated in the US Society of Professional Journalists' Code of Ethics that ''public enlightenment is the forerunner of justice and the foundation of democracy. The duty of the journalist is to further those ends by seeking truth and providing a fair and comprehensive account of events and issues''. In principle then, greater media access entails a better-informed electorate. If more and better information facilitates consensus, for example over whether and how policy X led to outcome Y, then deeper media penetration reduces polarization. However, current thinking is often less sanguine. Given greater media penetration, and hence greater media choice, individuals perhaps ideologically select media according to their predisposition (Iyengar and Hahn, 2009 ). This selection process arguably reinforces pre-existing differences in attitudes and behaviour (Slater, 2007) . Stroud (2010) finds a strong correlation between 'partisan 2 Note availability of information is not a sufficient condition for greater consensus, e.g. Dixit and Weibull (2007 selective exposure' and polarization using survey data, although importantly the direction of causality is not clear. Prior (2013) suggests that political elites in the US may have become more polarized with media penetration, though is more circumspect on evidence relating to the electorate as a whole. Nonetheless there is an ongoing suspicion of a 'malign' media that amplifies polarization.
Hence the benign hypothesis is that greater media penetration reduces polarization, whilst the malign hypothesis is the reverse. A key problem in the econometric analysis is endogeneity. More polarized societies might choose greater or less media access-in the former case perhaps in order to consume polarized analysis, or in the latter case as an act of disengagement. To overcome this problem the analysis focuses on the dynamic response of polarization and media levels. In particular given habitual voting and inertia in policy, under either hypothesis polarization would be expected to respond with a lag to changing media penetration. On the other hand given habitual media consumption, under reverse causality at least, polarization might lead media consumption levels.
Data
The sample spans 22 OECD countries between 1970 and 2003. 3 The dependent variable is constructed using party-level left-right ideology data produced by the Manifestos Research Group (MRG: Budge et al., 2001 and Klingemann et al., 2006) , denoted as rile pjt for party p in country j in year t, which in principle vary between −100 (extreme left) and +100 (extreme right). To construct a measure of polarization (POL jt ) in an election year within a particular country we estimate the standard deviation of the ideology distribution in the electorate using:
where V pjt is the proportion of votes received by party P in the election. Non-election years are interpolated. The mean value for POL jt is 17.0 and its standard deviation is 6.95. Notably there is no obvious time trend in polarization: the cross-country mean in 1970 was 15.7 whilst in 2003 it was 15.8. In a regression of POL jt on fixed country and time effects alone none of the time effects are estimated to be statistically significant. The least polarized election in the sample was Germany 1965 (POL jt = 2.47), perhaps reflecting the consensual approach to politics in this country following the second world war. The most polarized election was Finland 1945 (POL jt = 43.23), reflecting the presence of a politically strong communist party together with overtly anti-Soviet centrist and rightwing movements that prioritized Finnish sovereignty.
The within-country data are also plausible. In the UK for example, politics were fairly polarized in 1945 (POL jt = 21.4). inertia. 6 More latterly, with the emergence of New Labour, polarization has declined, with POL jt in single digits so far through the 21st century.
Media depth is measured by the number of televisions per 1000 people (tv), and the number of radios per 1000 people (radio) from the World Bank World Development Indicators database. Strömberg (2004) Table 1 contains regression results using annual data. Columns (1a) and (1b) report fixed effect regressions of POL jt respectively on tv and radio. The estimated coefficients in both instances are negative-in support of the benign view of the media: greater media presence coexists with reduced polarization in the electorate.
Evidence
Column (2) additionally includes time effects, and the magnitude of the estimated coefficient in the instance of tv (2a) increases substantially. Interestingly the estimated time effects in this case now exhibit an upward trend, offsetting the estimated negative effect of the upward-trending media variable. This means that countries in which the media expansion was less pronounced exhibited a relative increase in polarization, whilst those countries which more keenly embraced the new media exhibited a relative decline. The regression results in the case of radio are estimated with less precision when time effects are included, though the coefficient sign is consistent with before.
Column (3) extends the specification to include a set of control variables: real GDP per capita, population size, two demographic measures and trade openness. These results are similar to column (2). Interestingly trade is negatively associated with polarization. The estimated effect of tv continues to be negative and sizeable. Possibly the greater statistical significance in column (3b) of rgdpch and pop maybe compensating for tv which is excluded from this regression.
These results are suggestive, but by themselves do not establish causality. Table 2 addresses dynamic responses of polarization and media intensity. The analysis here uses 5-year averages of the data. It seems likely that ideology -both at the level of the individual voter and parties deciding on their position -should be slow moving. To only use a one year lag will likely understate this inertia. 5-year averages also likely improve measurement of the dependent variable-which are now less susceptible to particular manifestos or elections. Column 1 contains results where contemporaneous data are used. The results confirm those in column 3 of Table 1 , with slightly improved overall explanatory power as would be expected if the data are better measured.
Column (2) of Table 2 contains results where polarization is regressed on average media depth in the previous 5 year period. If the direction of causality runs from media to polarization, then these results would be expected to be negative, given behavioural inertia. It turns out that the estimated coefficients for both tv and radio are now negative and significant, supporting the benign view of the media. (1) and (2) the dependent variable is POL jt . In columns (3a) and (3b) the dependent variable is respectively tv and radio. Other notes as for Table 1 . * Denote significance at the 10% level. ** Denote significance at the 5% level. *** Denote significance at the 1% level.
As a first robustness check observations from Greece, Portugal and Spain were omitted. Democracy in these countries was more recently established and hence arguably media quality may be lower perhaps due to state control. Nonetheless the results (not reported) are qualitatively unaltered. In a second robustness check data for turnout were included as an additional control variable. Turnout by itself positively affects polarization as would be expected, but again the results related to the estimated effect of the media data are qualitatively unaltered. In column (3) the possibility of reverse causality is investigatedthe media variables are regressed upon the lag of polarization in an otherwise identical regression specification. In this case neither coefficient is significant. In the data observed media penetration increases lead reductions in measured polarization. Conversely changes to polarization do not lead changes in media consumption.
Using the estimates from column (2a) of Table 2 , a one standard deviation increase in media intensity as measured by tv (an additional 149 television sets per 1000 population) leads a reduction in polarization of around 5 points (70% of a standard deviation). The empirical relationship between polarization and the media is quantitatively large as well as statistically significant.
Conclusion
This note investigates the relationship between ideological polarization and the media. Using manifesto-based data for polarization and television and radio ownership data as a proxy for media intensity, we find a robust negative statistical association between the two variables wherein media penetration leads polarization but not vice-versa. The evidence is consistent with a 'benign' view of the media: greater consumption of the information transmitted empirically leads to greater political agreement.
